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Revealed preference theory offers a criterion for decision-making quality: if decisions are high quality
then there exists a utility function that the choices maximize. We conduct a large-scale field experiment
that enables us to test subjects' choices for consistency with utility maximization and to combine the
experimental data with a wide range of individual socioeconomic information for the subjects. There
is considerable heterogeneity in subjects' consistency scores: high-income and high-education subjects
display greater levels of consistency than low-income and low-education subjects, men are more consistent
than women, and young subjects are more consistent than older subjects. We also find that consistency
with utility maximization is strongly related to wealth: a standard deviation increase in the consistency
score is associated with 15-19 percent more wealth. This result conditions on socioeconomic variables
including current income, education, and family structure, and is little changed when we add controls
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1 Introduction
Traditional economic analysis assumes that choices are rational; decision makers choose their
preferred alternative from the feasible set given the information available to them. In this standard
view, heterogeneity in choices is attributed to heterogeneity in preferences, information, beliefs, or
constraints. More recently, several strands of empirical research consider heterogeneity in choices
driven, also, by di⁄erences in the quality of decision-making. Prominent examples of this research
include Ameriks et al. (2003), Bernheim and Garrett (2003), and Agarwal et al. (2009).
Whether we treat individuals as high-quality decision makers has important consequences. If
decision-making skills are poor or the costs of making an optimal decision are high, then there
are potentially important wedges between the choices that some individuals actually make and the
choices they would make if they had the skills or knowledge to make higher quality decisions. These
wedges matter because then ￿revealed￿preferences may not be ￿true￿underlying preferences. In
that case, positive predictions or welfare conclusions based on the revealed preferences may be
misleading.
While the possibility of heterogeneity in decision-making quality has important consequences
for economic analysis, de￿nitive judgment about the quality of decision-making is generally made
di¢ cult by twin problems of identi￿cation and measurement. The identi￿cation problem is to
distinguish di⁄erences in decision-making quality from unobserved di⁄erences in preferences, in-
formation, beliefs or constraints. Identi￿cation is important because welfare conclusions and thus
(constrained) optimal policy will depend on the sources of any systematic di⁄erences in choices. The
measurement problem is to de￿ne and implement a portable, practical, autonomous, quanti￿able,
and economically interpretable measure of decision-making quality.
In this paper, we measure aspects of decision-making quality by calculating how nearly in-
dividual choice behavior in an experiment complies with economic rationality in the sense of a
consistent (complete and transitive) preference ordering. Classical revealed preference theory tells
us that choices are consistent with maximizing a (well-behaved) utility function if and only if they
satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). We take the view that if there is
no utility function that choices maximize then those choices cannot be considered purposeful and,
in this way, high quality. This criterion for decision-making quality is not as restrictive as might be
thought. It simply requires consistent preferences over all possible alternatives, and choices that
correspond to the most preferred alternative in the feasible set. Any consistent preference ordering
2is admissible.1
Because GARP o⁄ers an exact test (either choice data satisfy GARP or they do not), a variety
of goodness-of-￿t indices have been proposed for quantifying the extent of violation. The main
index is Afriat￿ s (1972) Critical Cost E¢ ciency Index (CCEI). By de￿nition, the CCEI is bounded
between zero and one. The closer it is to one, the closer the data are to satisfying GARP; and
the di⁄erence between the CCEI and one can be interpreted as an upper bound of the fraction of
income that an individual is ￿wasting￿by making inconsistent choices.
Using revealed preference axioms, we test whether choice behavior in an experimental setting
by a broad population is consistent with the utility maximization model. Our points of departure
from the literature on decision-making quality, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and economic
outcomes derive from two observations:
[1] Consistency with utility maximization does not depend on preferences, and the experimental
task we study makes no special demands of outside knowledge or expertise. This helps to iso-
late heterogeneity in decision-making quality from heterogeneity in preferences, information,
beliefs or constraints (the identi￿cation problem).
[2] The CCEI (and other goodness-of-￿t indices) has a coherent economic interpretation and is
easily adapted for application in a variety of decision domains. The theoretical framework and
portability of the measure are valuable for drawing conclusions that go beyond the particular
setting of the experiment (the measurement problem).
There is a vast amount of work on the rationality of decisions, and laboratory experiments have
provided key empirical guideposts for developments in this area. To connect the insights that we
have gained from the experimental study of rational choice under laboratory conditions to practical
questions in the broader world, we conducted an experiment using the CentERpanel, a representa-
tive sample of over 2,000 Dutch-speaking households in the Netherlands. The advantage of using
the CentERpanel is the wide range of individual sociodemographic and economic information that
it provides about the panel members.
In our experiment, we present subjects with 25 standard consumer decision problems that can
be interpreted either as the selection of a bundle of commodities from a standard budget line or
the allocation of an endowment between risky assets. These decision problems are presented using
1Our laboratory experiment involves decision making under risk (more below). Our criterion for decision-making
quality does not, however, rely on a speci￿c theory of risk preferences. In particular, the criterion does not require
consistency with the Savage (1954) axioms. This is important because a great deal of experimental study of choice
under risk involves observed violations of Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000) review
the experimental and theoretical work that focuses on evaluating non-EUT theories.
3a graphical interface introduced by Choi et al. (2007a) and used by Choi et al. (2007b). Because
the design is user-friendly, it is possible to present each subject with many choices in the course
of a short experimental session, yielding a much larger data set than has been possible in the
past. This allows us to analyze the data at the level of the individual subject rather than pooling
data or assuming homogeneity across subjects. Because choices are from standard budget lines, we
can use revealed preference tests to investigate the extent to which the data comply with utility
maximization. Because we observe many choices over a wide range of budget lines, the data allow
high-power tests of revealed preference conditions.
By combining the capacity of our experimental setup with the CentERpanel, we provide three
types of analysis:
[1] We o⁄er a purely descriptive overview of the average quality of decisions by evaluating the
consistency of individual behaviors with the utility maximization model.
[2] We then move to a regression analysis of the relationship between decision-making quality
and sociodemographic and economic characteristics. In this way we address the question:
￿who is (more) rational?￿
[3] Finally, we connect the insights that we gain from the experimental study under laboratory
conditions to practical questions concerning wealth di⁄erentials in the real world.
If we follow Varian￿ s (1991) suggestion of a threshold of 0.95 for the CCEI, we ￿nd that 45.2
percent of our subjects￿scores are above this threshold, and of those, 22.8 percent have no violations
of GARP (a CCEI score of 1). To calibrate the CCEI scores we compare the behavior of our actual
subjects to the behavior of simulated subjects whose payo⁄s are perturbed by small idiosyncratic
preference shocks. We conclude that the choices of many subjects come close to satisfying GARP in
the sense that their violations are small enough to be attributed to the e⁄ect of a ￿trembling hand.￿
Nevertheless, over all subjects, the CCEI scores averaged 0.881, which implies that subjects on
average waste as much as 12.0 percent of their earnings by making ine¢ cient choices. There is also
marked heterogeneity in the CCEI scores within and across the sociodemographic characteristics
of our subjects. Figure 1 summarizes the mean CCEI scores and 95 percent con￿dence intervals
across selected socioeconomic categories.2 Alternative measures of GARP violations based on
Varian (1990, 1991) and Houtman and Maks (1985) (HM) yield qualitatively similar conclusions.
2In contrast, Choi et al. (2007b) report that 60 of their 93 subjects (64.6 percent) had CCEI scores above the 0.95
threshold and that over all subjects the CCEI scores averaged 0.937 (see Figure 1). The subjects of Choi et al. (2007b)
were undergraduate students and sta⁄ at UC Berkeley, and the experiment was conducted at the Experimental Social
Science Laboratory (Xlab) at UC Berkeley. We note that the subjects of Choi et al. (2007b) were given a larger and
richer menu of budget sets which provides more opportunities to violate GARP.
4[Figure 1 here]
We next move to studying, more systematically, the correlations between goodness-of-￿t indices
and sociodemographic and economic characteristics. Using Heckman￿ s (1979) sample-selection
model, we control for the possibility of sample-selection bias. Since the recruitment of CentERpanel
members to experiments is random by construction, our instrumental variable is the number of
completed CentERpanel questionnaires as a fraction of the total invitations to participate in the
three months preceding our experiment.
Our main ￿ndings are that high-income and high-education subjects display greater levels of
consistency than lower-income and lower-education subjects. Additionally, men are more consistent
than women, and young subjects tend more toward utility maximization than those who are old.
The magnitudes are large, implying, for example, that low-income subjects on average waste as
much as 3.3 percentage points more of their earnings by making ine¢ cient choices relative to high-
income subjects. The corresponding numbers for low-education subjects, females, and old subjects
are 2.6, 2.4, and 5.1, respectively.
Beyond consistency, we can also ask whether choices can be reconciled with a utility function
with some normatively appealing properties. In decision-making under uncertainty, it is natural
to ask whether choices are also consistent with the dominance principle in the sense of Hadar and
Russell (1969)￿ that is, the requirement that an allocation should be preferred to another, regardless
of subjects￿risk attitudes, if it yields unambiguously higher monetary payo⁄. The dominance
principle is compelling and generally accepted in decision theory.3 Overall, the choices made by
subjects in our experiment show low rates of stochastic dominance violations, which decrease with
education level and increase with age.
Finally, we examine whether our proposed measure of decision-making quality ￿the consistency
of the experimental data with the utility maximization hypothesis ￿is useful in explaining household
wealth di⁄erentials. Wealth accumulation is determined by countless individual decisions, made
over time in many di⁄erent environments, and involving a host of di⁄erent tradeo⁄s concerning risk,
time, and personal and social consumption. The task of explaining wealth di⁄erentials therefore
provides a particularly strong test of the predictive ability of our measure of decision-making quality.
The test is relatively strong because it does not just examine the power of behaviors in the laboratory
to predict related choices in a particular natural decision environment. Instead, it evaluates the
ability of a parsimonious measure of decision-making quality (revealed preferences in the laboratory)
to predict a broad economic outcome (wealth accumulation). The advantage of this approach is
3As noted by Quiggin (1990) and Wakker (1993), theories of choice under uncertainty were amended to avoid
violations of dominance.
5that it provides a parsimonious description of the laboratory data and it increases our chance of
rejecting the correlation, in Popper￿ s sense.
We are also motivated to consider wealth accumulation by several studies that document large
wealth di⁄erentials among households with similar life-time income. The extent to which these
di⁄erentials can be explained either by standard observables, such as family structure or income
volatility, or by standard unobservables, such as risk tolerance or intertemporal substitution, is a
subject of some debate (see, Bernheim et al., 2001, Ameriks et al., 2003, and Scholz et al., 2006,
for di⁄erent perspectives). If heterogeneity in decision-making quality is an important determinant
of wealth di⁄erentials, and if consistency with individual utility maximization in the experiment
is a good proxy for decision-making quality, then the patterns of behavior that we observe in the
laboratory should help explain di⁄erential patterns of wealth. Our data are particularly well-suited
to such investigations, given the heterogeneity in our experimental outcomes, and the heterogeneity
in our subject pool.
We ￿nd an economically large and statistically signi￿cant association between the CCEI and
household wealth. The point estimates indicate that, conditional on measures of current income,
education, basic sociodemographics and household structure, a standard deviation increase in the
CCEI of the person who is primarily responsible for household ￿nancial matters is associated
with 15-19 percent more household wealth. This result is little changed when we add controls
for violations of the dominance principle, a summary measure of risk tolerance, and a standard
conscientiousness test.4 The point estimates indicate that the latter two measures are related to
wealth in anticipated ways, but neither relationship is statistically distinguishable from zero. We
￿nd little evidence that the CCEI is capturing unobserved aspects of education or past income. We
do, however, ￿nd evidence that those with higher CCEI scores are substantially more likely to own
a home and they put a larger fraction of their wealth into their home. This is important because
the favorable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in the Netherlands gives home ownership
important advantages over renting and over investing in other assets with similar market returns.
In this way, owning a home and placing more wealth in mortgaged housing are often high quality
￿nancial decisions. Replacing the CCEI with consistency measures suggested by Varian (1990,
1991) and HM yields similar conclusions.
There are many important questions that remain to be explored using this data set. In work
in progress, we use the same data to relate ￿ndings on individual-level risk attitudes from the
4In psychology, conscientiousness is one of the ￿Big Five￿ factors (the other four are openness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and neuroticism) of personality which are commonly used to measure human personality. Barrick and
Mount (1991) conclude that conscientiousness appears to be the best predictor of economic outcomes. For a recent
comprehensive discussion, see Block (2010).
6experimental data with economic information and sociodemographic information on individuals.
We explain heterogeneity in preferences and in types of behaviors in terms of sociodemographic
variables and investigate the correspondence between individual investment and savings decisions
and behavior in the laboratory. This enhances our understanding of important economic decisions
such as savings and portfolio allocation, but it distracts from our fundamental purpose in this
paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 further discusses the notion of decision-
making quality. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 organizes
the experimental data. Section 5 contains the analysis of the relationship between decision-making
quality and sociodemographic and economic characteristics. Section 6 discusses the correspondence
between decision-making quality and wealth di⁄erentials. Section 7 describes the margins along
which we extend the previous literature. Section 8 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Decision-making quality
2.1 Identi￿cation and measurement
A relatively new empirical literature considers heterogeneity in choices driven by di⁄erences in
the quality of decision-making. This literature allows that the choices that some individuals actually
make may be di⁄erent from the choices they would make if they had the skills or knowledge to
make better decisions. Research in this vein considers the possibility that, even if they have all
relevant information, individuals might not have the ability to identify and make the choice that
best meets their objectives.
Ameriks et al. (2003) is a prominent example. That paper provides evidence that di⁄erences
in individuals￿propensity to plan and budgeting behaviors, rather than more standard sources of
heterogeneity, explain important variation in wealth accumulation. In another example, Bernheim
and Garrett (2003) ￿nd evidence that employer-based ￿nancial education increases saving. Agarwal
et al. (2009) show a U-shaped age pattern in the frequency of dominated choices regarding the use
of credit, with both relatively young and old consumers more prone to error.5
5Restricting attention just to the quality of ￿nancial decision-making, this literature also includes, among others,
Du￿ o and Saez (2003) who investigate the e⁄ect of ￿nancial education on saving, beyond its e⁄ect on lifetime
earnings; Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) document very low levels of ￿nancial planning, ￿nancial literacy, and a positive
correlation between literacy, ￿nancial planning and wealth; and Cole and Shastry (2009) emphasize the importance
of education, cognitive ability and ￿nancial literacy on ￿nancial market participation. Most recently, published in
the November 2010 issue of the Economic Journal (Volume 120, Issue 548), Banks (2010) summarizes the research
on the relationships between cognitive function, ￿nancial literacy and ￿nancial outcomes at older ages; Smith et al.
7The possibility that planning skills, ￿nancial education, experience or cognitive decline substan-
tially a⁄ect the quality of decision making is important because it suggests there are circumstances
when ￿revealed￿preferences may not be ￿true￿preferences. If so, then positive predictions and
welfare conclusions based on the ￿revealed￿preferences may be misleading.
Through the collection of uncommonly high quality data, or the exploitation of natural experi-
ments or instrumental variables, the research in this new literature has provided convincing evidence
of important di⁄erences in decision-making quality. In general, however, de￿nitive judgement about
decision-making quality is made di¢ cult by twin problems of identi￿cation and measurement.
Identi￿cation The identi￿cation problem is to distinguish di⁄erences in decision-making
quality from unobserved di⁄erences in preferences, information, beliefs or constraints.
In observational data, it is usually unclear whether those with less (￿nancial) education, or lower
cognitive abilities, fewer planning skills or less ￿nancial literacy are making lower quality decisions as
opposed to holding di⁄erent beliefs, or having di⁄erent preferences over the same outcomes, or facing
di⁄erent incentives and constraints. Moreover, the identi￿cation problem presupposes a measurable
notion of decision-making quality. In some cases the relevant incentives are su¢ ciently clear and
data quality is su¢ ciently high, so that regarding some decisions as higher quality is straightforward
and uncontroversial. More generally, a measure of decision-making quality is di¢ cult to formalize,
quantify and to make practical and portable for use in a variety of choice environments. These
features of a measure are especially important to the extent that decision-making quality is a trait￿ a
characteristic of a person that a⁄ects decisions in many di⁄erent contexts.
Measurement The measurement problem is to de￿ne and implement a portable, practical,
autonomous, quanti￿able, and economically interpretable measure of decision-making quality.
2.2 The revealed preference criterion
In this paper, we measure aspects of decision-making quality by the compliance of choices with
economic rationality. In his Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947), Paul Samuelson o⁄ered
a natural criterion for decision-making quality based solely on observable behavior. Adopting
Samuelson￿ s approach, we will say that choices are lower quality if there is no well-de￿ned (utility)
function that the choices maximize. Classical revealed preference theory provides a direct test:
choices are consistent with maximizing a utility function if and only if they satisfy the GARP.
(2010) and Banks et al. (2010) show that wealth and retirement saving patterns are associated with numerical and
other cognitive abilities at middle and older ages; and Van Den Berg et al. (2010) and Jappelli (2010) explore some
of the potential causes of the di⁄erences in cognitive function and ￿nancial literacy in later life.
8Since GARP imposes the complete set of conditions implied by utility-maximization, the CCEI
and other goodness-of-￿t indices provide a stringent test of decision-making quality.
The primary contribution to method of this work is an experimental technique that allows for
the collection of richer data about preferences than has previously been possible and can easily
be adapted to a wide range of decision-making experiments in large-scale surveys. As a result,
the entire apparatus developed here ￿analytical and experimental techniques ￿has a number of
distinctive features that make it useful for evaluating the quality of economic decision-making:
￿ Portable The analytical techniques and experimental platforms are applicable to many other
types of individual choice problems involving personal and social consumption. They can thus
make domain-speci￿c predictions and provide a uni￿ed measure of decision-making quality
across domains.
￿ Practical In the real world, changes in income and relative prices are such that budget lines
do not cross frequently. This means that market data typically lack power to test revealed
preference conditions (Blundell et al., 2003). Our subjects were given a large and rich menu
of budget sets which leads to high power tests.
￿ Autonomous Consistency with GARP is not a⁄ected by preferences and the experimental
task we study makes no special demands of outside knowledge or expertise, thus helping to iso-
late heterogeneity in decision-making quality from heterogeneity in preferences, information,
beliefs or constraints (the identi￿cation problem).
￿ Quanti￿able The CCEI (and other goodness-of-￿t indices) measures the extent of GARP
violation. In contrast with hypothetical (and unincentivized) survey questions, we can un-
derstand the results in terms of economic theory, which helps us interpret (as well as design)
the experiments.
￿ Interpretable The CCEI has a coherent economic interpretation. Because of our rich data
set, we are able to generate fairly tight bounds on the CCEI and use these bounds to judge
the e⁄ects of decision-making quality.
A last feature of the apparatus developed here is that the method and measure may be evalu-
ated for their ability to predict important behavior in ￿the wild.￿In this paper we consider whether
the CCEI as measured in the experiment can help explain heterogeneity in the wealth holdings of
households with similar lifetime incomes. Using di⁄erent surveys and populations, the same basic
methods could be used to investigate whether heterogeneity in this measure of decision-making
9quality can help explain heterogeneity in consumption choices, insurance purchase, retirement de-
cisions, or health investments among other important behaviors.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Sample
The experiment uses the CentERpanel, an online, weekly, strati￿ed survey of a sample of over
2,000 households and 5,000 individual members. The panel is designed to be representative of
the Dutch-speaking population in the Netherlands. The CentERpanel thus provides a unique
opportunity to combine experimental data with sociodemographic and economic variables from the
survey. The subjects in the experiment were randomly recruited from the entire CentERpanel body.
The experiment was conducted online under the CentERdata protocol with 1,182 CentERpanel
adult members, using the experimental technique introduced by Choi et al. (2007a) and used by
Choi et al. (2007b).6 The experimental method allows us to identify individual behaviors that may
be related to a wide range of individual characteristics.
Table 1 below provides summary statistics of individual level characteristics. We present the
data for participants (completed the experiment), dropouts (logged in and quit the experiment)
and nonparticipants (recruited for the experiment but never logged in). We use six socioeconomic
categories: gender, age, completed education, household income, occupation, and household com-
position. The groupings of di⁄erent levels of completed education are based on the categorization
of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). The low, medium and high educa-
tion levels correspond to primary or pre-vocational secondary education, pre-university secondary
education or senior vocational training, and vocational college or university education, respectively.
We use household monthly gross income-level categories such that the proportions of participants
in each category are approximately equal. The classi￿cation of occupations is based on the catego-
rization of Statistics Netherlands.
[Table 1 here]
6CentERdata is an independent research institute a¢ liated with the Tilburg School of Economics and Management
(TiSEM) at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. CentERdata specializes in online experiments and manages the
CentERpanel and several other panels. The panel members complete the questionnaires over the Internet. For more
information, see http://www.centerdata.nl/en/centerpanel.
103.2 Procedures
Our experimental interface was incorporated into the CentERpanel and the experiment was
hosted as part of their survey. In our experiment, we presented subjects with several decision
problems under risk. Each decision problem was presented as a choice from a two-dimensional
budget line. A choice of the allocation (x;y) from the budget line represents an allocation between
accounts x and y (corresponding to the horizontal and vertical axes). The actual payo⁄s of a
particular choice were determined by the allocation to the x and y accounts such that the subject
received the points allocated to one of the accounts x or y, determined at random and equally
likely. Choices were made using the computer mouse or the keyboard arrows to move the pointer
on the computer screen to the desired point and then clicking or hitting the enter key.7 Payo⁄s
were calculated in terms of points and then converted into euros. Each point was worth e0.25.
Subjects received their payment from the CentERpanel reimbursement system via direct deposit
into a bank account.
The procedures described below are identical to those used by Choi et al. (2007b), with the
exception that the experiment described here consisted of 25, rather than 50, decision problems
and that there were some minor additional changes resulting from the online experimental setting.8
Each decision problem started with the computer selecting a budget line randomly from the set of
budget lines that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more points, but with no intercept
exceeding 100 points. This variation in budget lines (prices and incomes) is essential for a thorough
test of consistency (more below). The budget lines selected for each subject in di⁄erent decision
problems were independent of each other and of the sets selected for any of the other subjects in
their decision problems. Choices were restricted to allocations on the budget constraint.9 During
7The experimental method is applicable to other types of individual choice problems. Ahn et al. (2010) extended
the work of Choi et al. (2007b) on risk (known probabilities) to settings with ambiguity (unknown probabilities).
Fisman et al. (2007, 2010) employ a similar platform to study distributional preferences and produce very di⁄erent
behaviors. It is possible that presenting choice problems graphically biases choice behavior in a particular way￿ and
that is a useful topic of experiment￿ but there is no evidence that this is the case, as emphasized by Choi et al.
(2007b) and Fisman et al. (2007).
8The number of individual decisions is still higher than is usual in the literature, and the experiments provide us
with a rich data set consisting of enough individual decisions over a wide range of budget lines to provide a powerful
test of consistency. The revealed preference analysis presented below shows that the variation in budget lines (prices
and incomes) is su¢ cient for a rigorous test of consistency.
9Like Choi et al. (2007b), we restricted choices to allocations on the budget constraint so that subjects could not
dispose of payo⁄s. In Fisman et al. (2007), each choice involved choosing a point on a graph representing a budget
set over possible allocations. Since most of their subjects had no violations of budget balancedness (those who did
violate budget balancedness also had many GARP violations even among the subset of their choices that were on
11the course of the experiment, subjects were not provided with any information about the account
that had been selected in each round. At the end of the experiment, the computer selected one
decision round for each subject, where each round had an equal probability of being chosen, and
the subject was paid the amount he had earned in that round.
The resolution of the budget lines allow subjects to adjust their allocations by amounts as small
as 0.2 points. At the beginning of each decision round, the experimental program dialog window
went blank and the entire setup reappeared. The appearance and behavior of the pointer were set
to the Windows mouse default and the pointer was automatically repositioned randomly on the
budget line at the beginning of each round. Full experimental instructions, including the computer
program dialog windows, are also available at Online Appendix I.10
4 Data description
We next provide an overview of some basic features of the individual-level data. Without loss of
generality, assume the individual￿ s income is normalized to 1. The budget set is then p1x1+p2x2 = 1





the data generated by an individual￿ s choices, where pi denotes the i-th observation of the price
vector and xi denotes the associated allocation.11
4.1 Consistency
Following Afriat￿ s (1967) theorem, we employ the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP) to test whether the ￿nite set of observed price and quantity data that our experiment
generated may be rationalized by a utility function U(x1;x2).12 GARP (which is a generalization
of various other revealed preference tests) requires that if xi is indirectly revealed preferred to xj,
then xj is not strictly and directly revealed preferred (pjxi ￿ pjxj) to xi. The theory tells us that
if the data satisfy GARP, then a utility function that rationalizes the observed allocations exists
and, moreover, may be chosen to be well-behaved (piecewise linear, continuous, increasing, and
the budget constraint), we restricted choices to allocations on the budget constraint, which simpli￿ed the decision
problem and made the computer program easier to use.
10Online Appendix I: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/CKMS_I_A1.pdf.





























are the endpoints of the budget line, so we can calculate








2 = 1 for each observation i.
12Varian (1982, 1983) modi￿es Afriat￿ s (1967) results and describes e¢ cient and general techniques for testing the
extent to which choices satisfy GARP.
12concave).13
Although testing conformity with GARP is conceptually straightforward, there is an obvious
di¢ culty: GARP provides an exact test of utility maximization ￿either the data satisfy GARP
or they do not. We assess how nearly individual choice behavior complies with GARP by using
Afriat￿ s (1972) CCEI, which measures the fraction by which each budget constraint must be shifted
in order to remove all violations of GARP. If the CCEI is close to one, the subject is wasting very
little of his earnings. Otherwise, he may be wasting quite a lot. In this sense the CCEI measures
the overall ￿e¢ ciency￿of individual behavior.
Put precisely, for any number 0 ￿ e ￿ 1, de￿ne the direct revealed preference relation
xiRD(e)xj , epi ￿ xi ￿ pi ￿ xj;
and de￿ne R(e) to be the transitive closure of RD(e). Let e￿ be the largest value of e such that the
relation R(e) satis￿es GARP. The CCEI is the value of e￿ associated with the data set f(pi;xi)g25
i=1.
By de￿nition, the CCEI is between zero and one￿ indices closer to one mean the data are closer to
perfect consistency with GARP and hence to perfect consistency with utility maximization￿ and
can be interpreted as saying that the individual is wasting as much as 1 ￿ e￿ of the income by
making ine¢ cient choices. Hence, the CCEI may overstate the extent of ine¢ ciency, but the above
procedure is the ￿least costly￿adjustment for removing all violations of GARP.
We provide more details on testing for consistency with GARP and discuss the alternative
indices that have been proposed by Varian (1990, 1991) and HM in online Appendix II.14 In
reporting our results, we focus on the CCEI, which o⁄ers a straightforward interpretation. In
practice, all these measures yield similar conclusions. The tables based on the indices proposed by
Varian (1990, 1991) and HM are presented in Online Appendix III.15,16
Table 2 below provides a summary of the individual-level CCEI scores. We report the statistics
for all subjects, as well as the statistics by socioeconomic categories. The CCEI scores averaged
0.881 over all subjects, and ranged from 0.920 for subjects younger than 35 to 0.843 for subjects age
65 and older. There is also considerable heterogeneity within and across categories. The analysis
13Satisfying GARP entails only that choices are consistent with the utility maximization model. The further
implication, that the choices may be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function, is a consequence of linear budget
constraints. Given that the budget constraints are linear, if a rationalizing utility function exists then we cannot
reject the hypothesis that it is well-behaved.
14Online Appendix II: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/CKMS_I_A2.pdf.
15Online Appendix III: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/CKMS_I_A3.pdf.
16All indices are computationally intensive for even moderately large data sets. We compute the Houtman-Maks
scores using the algorithm developed by Dean and Martin (2010). (The computer program and details of the algo-
rithms are available from the authors upon request.)
13of the relationship between the di⁄erences in consistency scores and sociodemographic di⁄erences
among experimental subjects is the purpose of our regression analysis below.17
[Table 2 here]
4.2 Power and goodness-of-￿t
Revealed preference tests have an important drawback: there is no natural threshold for deter-
mining whether subjects are close enough to satisfying GARP that they can be considered utility
maximizers. Varian (1991) suggests a threshold of 0.95 for the CCEI. If we follow Varian￿ s (1991)
suggestion, we ￿nd that out of the 1,182 subjects, 534 subjects (45.2 percent) have CCEI scores
above this threshold and of those 269 subjects (22.8 percent) have no violations of GARP.
To generate a benchmark against which to compare our CCEI scores, we use the test designed
by Bronars (1987), which builds on Becker (1962) and employs the choices of a hypothetical subject
who chooses randomly among all allocations on each budget line as a point of comparison. The
mean CCEI score across all subjects in our experiment is 0.881 whereas the mean CCEI score for
a random sample of 25,000 simulated subjects is only 0.659. Moreover, more than half of actual
subjects have CCEI￿ s above 0.925, while only about ￿ve percent of simulated subjects have CCEI￿ s
that high.
The Bronars￿(1987) test has often been applied to experimental data, so using it situates our
results in a literature (more below). The setup used in this study has the highest Bronar power
of one (all random subjects had violations). Our results show that the experiment is su¢ ciently
powerful to exclude the possibility that consistency is the accidental result of random behavior.
To provide a more informative metric of the consistency of choices, we follow Choi et al. (2007a)
who extend and generalize the Bronars (1987) test. In the interest of brevity, the analysis has been
relegated to Online Appendix II.18
4.3 Beyond consistency
Choices can be consistent with GARP and yet fail to be reconciled with any utility function
that is normatively appealing given the decision problem at hand. For example, consider choices in
the experiment that always allocate all points to x1. This behavior is consistent with maximizing
17To allow for small trembles resulting from the slight imprecision of subjects￿handling of the mouse, our consistency
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18Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) develop power indices for revealed preference tests based on CCEI and discuss
the prior indices of Bronars (1987) and Famulari (1995).
14the utility function U(x1;x2) = x1 and would generate a CCEI score of 1. Such preferences are,
however, hard to justify given that the commodity in each state is the same (money), and the
realization of the state a⁄ects nothing except which account pays o⁄. Moreover, for many of the
budget lines that a subject faces, allocating all points to x1 means allocating all points to the more
expensive asset, a violation of monotonicity with respect to ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.
Violations of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance may reasonably be regarded as errors, regardless
of risk attitudes￿ that is, as a failure to recognize that some allocations yield payo⁄ distributions
with unambiguously lower returns. A simple violation of dominance is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
The budget line is de￿ned by the straight line AE and the axes measure the future value of a possible
allocation in each of the two states. The point B, which lies on the 45 degree line, corresponds to
an allocation with a certain outcome. The individual chooses allocation x (position along AB), but
could have chosen any allocation x0 (position along CD) such that Fx0 ￿ Fx where Fx0 and Fx are
the resulting payo⁄ distributions. If this individual only cares about the distribution of monetary
payo⁄s, then he will be willing to pay a positive price for a portfolio yielding Fx0 ￿ Fx, which
has only nonpositive payo⁄s (that is, for a portfolio in which each asset had an equal probability
of being chosen). Notice that any decision to allocate fewer points to the cheaper asset (that
is, corresponding to a position along AB) violates dominance but need not involve a violation of
GARP, whereas any decision to allocate more points to the cheaper asset (that is, corresponding
to a position along BE) never violates dominance.
[Figure 2 here]
If subjects identi￿ed an allocation with the resulting probability distribution over payo⁄s then
preferences would satisfy the reduction principle; that is, (x1;x2) ￿ (x2;x1) because they generate
the same payo⁄ distribution. If preferences satisfy the reduction principle then, subject to every
budget constraint, choices would allocate weakly more points to the cheaper asset. We would
like to test whether preferences satisfy the reduction principle by observing choices from linear
budget sets. Unfortunately, this is not possible: choices from linear budget sets determine the
demand function but the demand function does not uniquely determine preferences (Mas-Colell,
1977; 1978). However, symmetry provides implications about choices from linear budget sets (that
is, about demand functions) that are testable on the basis of observed choices from standard budget
sets.
We identify choice behavior as symmetric if (x￿
1;x￿
2) is chosen subject to the budget constraint
p1x1 + p2x2 = 1 if and only if (x￿
2;x￿
1) is chosen subject to the mirror-image budget constraint
p2x1+p1x2 = 1. That is, choice behavior responds symmetrically to inverse price ratios.19 Clearly,
19The reduction principle implies that choice behavior is symmetric only when the derived demand function is single
15if choice behavior is symmetric then the choice subject to every budget constraint allocates more
points to the cheaper asset. Hence, symmetry imposes restrictive (if convenient) patterns on demand
behavior, but it is a natural result of symmetric probabilities (each account had an equal probability
of being chosen).
To test whether choice behavior is symmetric (for a given subject), we can combine the actual
data from the experiment and the mirror-image data, compute the CCEI for this combined data
set, and compare that number to the CCEI for the actual data.20 By de￿nition, the CCEI score for
the combined data set consisting of 50 observations can be no bigger than the CCEI score for the
actual data. Clearly, always allocating all points to one of the assets generates severe violations of
GARP in the combined data set, but the subset of actual data is perfectly consistent.21 Similarly,
any decision to allocate fewer points to the cheaper asset will necessarily generate a simple violation
of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) involving its mirror-image decision.
Thus, we can construct a formal non-parametric test of symmetric behavior by following the
strategy above: compute the CCEI for the combined data set and compare that number to the
CCEI for the actual data set. The di⁄erence re￿ ects an upper bound on the additional income that
the subject is wasting by not always allocating more points to the cheaper asset. Nevertheless,
the combined data set obviously provides a more stringent test of GARP so it can contain new
violations of GARP even if actual choices always allocated more points to the cheaper asset.
If we again follow Varian￿ s (1991) suggestion of a threshold of 0.95 for the CCEI, we ￿nd that
in the combined data set the scores of 251 subjects (21.2 percent) are above this threshold and of
those only 24 (2.0 percent) have no violations of GARP. Table 3 below reports summary statistics
and percentile values of the CCEI scores for the combined data set. We report the statistics for all
subjects, as well as the statistics by socioeconomic categories. The last column lists the di⁄erence
between the mean CCEI￿ s for the actual data set and for the combined data set. The CCEI scores
for the combined data set averaged only 0.733 over all subjects, and ranged from 0.786 for subjects
younger than 35 to 0.679 for subjects age 65 and older, representing a decrease from the CCEI
scores for the actual data set of 0.148, 0.134 and 0.165, respectively. Overall, a sociodemographic
category that had a lower mean actual CCEI score exhibits a larger decrease. In our econometric
analysis below, we use both the CCEI scores for the actual data set and for the combined data set.
[Table 3 here]
valued. GARP is also compatible with multi-valued demand functions so preferences may not be strictly convex.
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21Of the 1,182 subjects in the experiment, only 29 subjects (2.5 percent) almost always allocated all points to one
of the assets by choosing the same endpoint of the budget line.
164.4 Risk attitudes
We summarize attitudes toward risk with a univariate measure, which we will use to capture
risk aversion in the regression analysis concerning wealth di⁄erentials.22 Because the experiment
is symmetric and budget lines are drawn from a symmetric distribution, we summarize the risk
attitudes of our subjects by reporting the fraction of points allocated to the cheaper asset. The
only behavior consistent with in￿nite risk aversion is always allocating the points equally between
the two assets. On the other hand, always allocating all points to the cheaper asset is the behavior
that would be implied by pure local risk neutrality. In general, subjects who are less averse to risk
will allocate a larger fraction of points to the cheaper asset.
Figure 3 below displays the mean fraction of points allocated to the cheaper asset and 95
percent con￿dence intervals across the socioeconomic categories. Note that there is considerable
heterogeneity in risk attitudes across categories, which is characteristic of all these data, and that
risk attitudes and CCEI scores are modestly correlated (r2 = 0:113). The distributions of the
fraction of points allocated to the cheaper asset are quite similar across categories: all have a
mode near the midpoint of 0.5, and the distribution falls o⁄ sharply away from midpoint, with
mass concentrated to the right. There have been many attempts to recover risk preferences from
subjects￿decisions in a variety of laboratory experiments. A signi￿cant fraction of our subjects
exhibit moderate to high levels of risk preferences. As Figure 3 shows, our individual-level measures
of risk aversion are higher than the measures reported in Choi et al. (2007b), but they are within
the range of recent estimates from recent studies (See Choi et al., 2007b, for a discussion of these
studies).
[Figure 3 here]
5 Decision-making quality and sociodemographics
The relatively large and heterogeneous CentERpanel sample and accompanying survey data
allow us to perform what is, to our knowledge, the ￿rst analysis of the correlation between sociode-
mographic and economic characteristics and GARP violations. Table 4 below presents the results
of our individual-level econometric analysis. In column (1), we present estimates with the CCEI
22In work in progress with these data, we build on Choi et al. (2007b) to estimate preferences using a two-parameter
utility function based on Gul (1991) ￿one parameter is the familiar coe¢ cient of risk aversion and the other is a
measure of loss/disappointment aversion ￿and we relate the individual-level estimates to individual characteristics
and external choices.
17scores for the actual data set using ordinary least squares.23 The results show signi￿cant correla-
tions. We obtain statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in all sociodemographic categories, ranging in
absolute values from about 0.025 to just over 0.050. These magnitudes are large, implying that
sociodemographic di⁄erences can account for signi￿cant di⁄erential changes in income loss due to
inconsistent choice patterns. Most notably, females, low-education, low-income, and old subjects
on average waste as much as 2.4, 2.6, 3.3, and 5.1 percentage points more of their earnings, respec-
tively, by making ine¢ cient choices.24 In columns (2) we repeat the estimation reported in columns
(1) using the CCEI scores for the combined data set.25 The corresponding estimates are of greater
magnitude and statistically signi￿cant in the age and education categories.26
[Table 4 here]
Our analysis above is based on the non-randomly selected subsample of participants. The lack
of observations on panel members who chose not to participate or did not complete the experiment
creates a missing data problem. We correct for the possible sample selection bias in our econometric
analysis below, using Heckman￿ s (1979) method.27 Our exclusion restriction rests on the number
of completed CentERpanel questionnaires as a fraction of the total invitations to participate in the
three months prior to our experiment entering the participation equation but not being conditionally
correlated with rationality. Our identifying assumption is that this ￿participation ratio￿in￿ uences
the participation in our experiment but does not in￿ uence the laboratory outcomes of interest
(Bellemare et al., 2008).
23To test for a potential misspeci￿cation, we used Ramsey￿ s (1969) RESET test by adding the squared and cubed
￿tted values of the regression equation as additional regressors, and found no evidence of misspeci￿cation (p-value =
0:3098).
24Agarwal et al. (2009) document a U-shaped relationship between age and mistakes in ￿nancial decision making,
suggesting that, although some cognitive abilities decline with age, experience in ￿nancial markets rises with it. We
￿nd that consistency with GARP and hence consistency with utility maximization decline dramatically over the
lifecycle.
25We also separately examine the patterns of stochastic dominance violations in the data. Using OLS and Tobit, we
obtain statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients only in the age and education categories. Using Heckman￿ s (1979) method
to correct for possible sample selection bias, only the age coe¢ cients are negative and signi￿cant. Overall, subject
choices generally satisfy the dominance principle. In the interest of brevity, we do not report this analysis here.
26Since the CCEI is a number between zero and one, we repeat the estimations reported in columns (1) and (2)
using a fractional regression model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). The two speci￿cations yield similar results.
27We also use Heckman￿ s sample selection model to analyze the correlates of the Varian (1990, 1991) measure.
For the third measure, proposed by HM, we estimate the sample selection model of Terza (1998). These results are
provided in Online Appendix III.
18The estimation results are reported in Table 5 below. In column (1), we omit the nonpartici-
pants, focusing on the subsample of participants and dropouts in the data. In column (2), we repeat
the estimation reported in column (1), after adding the nonparticipants. We obtain qualitatively
similar results on the reduced sample and the entire sample. Finally, testing the null hypothesis
that the correlation coe¢ cient ￿ is zero is equivalent to testing for sample selection. In columns
(1) and (2), we ￿nd that ￿ is indistinguishable from zero and thus we ￿nd no evidence of bias.
We interpret these results to indicate that self-selection is not importantly driving the results. It
is also noteworthy that in both speci￿cations the coe¢ cient on the exclusion restriction variable
is positive and signi￿cant, and that many sociodemographic categories are signi￿cantly correlated
with participation. In columns (3) and (4), we repeat the estimation reported in columns (1) and
(2) using the CCEI scores for the combined data set and obtain similar results.
[Table 5 here]
6 Wealth di⁄erentials and decision-making quality
We next examine whether the extent to which individual decisions satisfy GARP ￿and are
therefore consistent with the utility maximization model ￿is useful in explaining household wealth
di⁄erentials. Conditional on income, wealth represents the accumulation of innumerable ￿nancial
decisions. It is therefore natural to use wealth as a summary variable with which to evaluate the
predictive ability of our proposed measure of decision-making quality. By studying the relationship
between wealth and the consistency scores, we can also evaluate the role of decision-making quality
in determining why households with similar life-time incomes and sociodemographic characteristics
accumulate very di⁄erent amounts of wealth (Bernheim et al., 2001, and Ameriks et al., 2003).28 If
heterogeneity in decision-making quality were an important determinant of heterogeneity in wealth,
and if consistency in the experiment were a good proxy for ￿nancial decision-making quality, then
di⁄erences across subjects should help explain di⁄erential patterns of wealth.
6.1 Wealth data
The CentERpanel collects information about wealth on an annual basis. Panel members are
asked to identify a ￿nancial respondent who is ￿most involved with the ￿nancial administration
28Scholz et al. (2006) ￿nd that heterogeneity in decision-making quality is not necessary to explain much of the
heterogeneity in wealth. They show that by using detailed data on household-speci￿c earnings paths from the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS), the optimal decision rules from a life cycle model can account for more than 80 percent
of the cross-sectional variation in wealth. We will return to this issue in the econometric analysis (Table 8).
19of the household.￿All panel members age 16 and older respond to questions about the assets and
liabilities that they hold alone. The ￿nancial respondent also provides information about assets
and liabilities that are jointly held by more than one member of the household. The inventory
covers checking and saving accounts, stocks, bonds and other ￿nancial asset holdings, real estate,
business assets, mortgages, loans, and extended lines of credit. The data do not include informa-
tion on pension wealth.29 Our analysis focuses on household wealth, calculated by summing net
worth over household members and taking the household￿ s average over 2008 and 2009. Summary
statistics of this measure of wealth, and some of its components, are reported in Table 6 below.
Table 6 summarizes the wealth of the 703 households with wealth data and a CCEI score from the
household￿ s ￿nancial respondent. The median household has a net worth of nearly e93K ($136K)
and the distribution is positive-skewed. The mean household wealth of e164K ($272K) is consid-
erably higher than the median and the highest values are more than 15 standard deviations above
the mean.
[Table 6 here]
Anticipating our regression analysis, Table 7 reports some components of wealth, by the CCEI
score of the household￿ s ￿nancial respondent. More precisely, this panel gives the means of wealth
components for all of the analysis sample, for those whose age-adjusted CCEI score is below the
median, and for those whose age-adjusted CCEI score is above the median.30 To reduce the
importance of extreme outliers, we drop the 10 households that represent the top and bottom
half of one percent of the wealth distribution and the bottom half of one percent of the CCEI
distribution. The statistics reported in Table 7 show that housing wealth is a central component
of wealth outside of pension systems. On average, the sample owns a house worth e184K ($324K)
and holds a mortgage of e62K ($109K). Various savings accounts and stocks are the next two
most important, though much smaller, components of wealth. The di⁄erences in means between
households with higher and lower CCEI are never statistically signi￿cant, though some of them are
economically large. For example, ￿nancial respondents with higher CCEI scores have an average
household wealth that is e4,260 ($7,512) higher than those with lower CCEI scores. Restricting
attention to households with positive net worth, the di⁄erences in the average log of household
wealth is 0.16. These simple di⁄erences in means summarize many correlations, which we parse in
29Nearly all of the Dutch population is covered by the public pension system, and a large majority of workers
is covered by private pensions associated with their employment. Nearly all of these employment-based plans are
de￿ned bene￿t, the vast majority of which pay bene￿ts as a function of lifetime earnings. See Alessie and Kapteyn
(2001) and OECD (2009) for details about the pension systems in the Netherlands.
30The age-adjusted CCEI is the residual from a regression of CCEI on a constant, age, age
2 and age
3.
20the regression analyses below.
[Table 7 here]
6.2 Wealth regressions
To describe the relationship between consistency with utility-maximizing behavior in the labo-
ratory and wealth di⁄erentials, our basic approach is to estimate regressions of the natural log of
household wealth on sociodemographic variables (including a ￿ exible function of age), the natural
log of household income, and the CCEI score of the ￿nancial respondent in the household. The
estimation results are reported in Table 8 below. The sample size drops from 703 to 566 house-
hold (80.5 percent). This decline is driven almost exclusively by 74 households (10.5 percent) with
negative net worth and thus a missing dependent variable and 54 households (7.7 percent) with
negative or missing household income in 2008. In addition, given our relatively small sample and
the presence of extreme outliers, we also drop seven households that represent the union of the top
and bottom half of one percent of the wealth distribution and the bottom half of one percent of
the distribution of CCEI scores. Two additional households are dropped due to missing data on
education.
[Table 8 here]
Baseline. In column (1), we present estimates from our main econometric speci￿cation using the
entire analysis sample. The point estimate of 1.17 on the CCEI indicates that a standard deviation
increase in the CCEI score of the household￿ s ￿nancial respondent is associated with nearly 16
percent more household wealth. As one might expect from a relatively small sample of data on
self-reported wealth, the standard error on this point estimate is fairly large. Nevertheless, we can
reject a null hypothesis of no relationship at the 5 percent level (p-value=0.029) with standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity.
Life-cycle. At younger ages, those with better lifetime opportunities may have lower wealth as
they borrow in order to invest or to smooth lifetime consumption. With that in mind, in column
(2), we repeat the estimation reported in column (1) with the sample restricted to households
with ￿nancial respondents who are at least 35 years old. We ￿nd that the point estimate on the
CCEI is somewhat larger at older ages so a standard deviation increase in the CCEI score of the
household￿ s ￿nancial respondent is associated with about 19 percent more household wealth. The
standard error on this point estimate is relatively large, so while we can reject a null hypothesis
21of no relationship with considerable con￿dence (p-value=0.012) we cannot reject a null hypothesis
that the point estimates on the CCEI reported in columns (1) and (2) are the same.
Levels. The log speci￿cation restricts attention to those with strictly positive wealth. The spec-
i￿cation may also cause small di⁄erences at positive but very low levels of wealth to have large
e⁄ects on estimates. To evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the log speci￿cation, in column
(3) we estimate the regression in levels (of wealth and income) on the sample ages 35 and older.
We again see an economically large association between the CCEI and levels of wealth, though this
relationship is not estimated as precisely; the coe¢ cient on the CCEI is signi￿cant only at the 10
percent level (p-value=0.058).
Cognitive abilities and education. We interpret our CCEI scores as capturing aspects of
decision-making quality. We take this view because choices that are closer to satisfying GARP
can be seen as more purposeful; they re￿ ect more consistent treatment of tradeo⁄s regardless of
preferences, information or beliefs. An alternative view is that the CCEI captures unobserved
aspects of cognitive ability or education that are correlated with ￿nancial outcomes through their
correlation with preferences, information, beliefs or unobserved constraints. The CentERpanel
survey does not include measures of IQ (and this is an important topic for future work), but we
can assess whether unobserved aspects of education are driving the relationship between the CCEI
and wealth if we assume that these unobserved variables are positively correlated with observed
education levels.
If so, and if these unobserved variables are important sources of the observed correlation between
consistency and wealth, then conditioning on observed education should have a substantial e⁄ect on
the estimated coe¢ cient on the CCEI. To this end, in column (4), we repeat the estimation reported
in column (2) after omitting the controls for the formal education of the ￿nancial respondent.
Comparing the estimates from columns (2) and (4), we see that removing the education controls
has only a modest e⁄ect on the estimated coe¢ cient on the CCEI. In this way, we ￿nd little evidence
that the relationship between consistency with utility maximization in the laboratory and wealth
is driven by a correlation between the CCEI and unobserved aspects of education.
Beyond consistency. Restricting attention to the sample ages 35 and older, in column (5), we
repeat the estimation reported in column (2) after adding the CCEI scores for the combined data set
(combining the actual data from the experiment and the mirror-image data). We ￿nd no evidence
that, conditional on the CCEI score from the actual data, the CCEI score for the combined data
set has an independent relationship with wealth. Adding the CCEI for the combined data set as
a regressor has only a modest e⁄ect on the point estimate of the coe¢ cient on the CCEI; and the
22point estimate of the conditional relationship between the CCEI for the combined data set and
log household wealth is small, but imprecisely estimated. These results are consistent with the
idea that the CCEI for the combined data set, while imposing natural requirements on demand
behavior, merely represents a noisier measure of the aspects of decision-making quality captured
by the CCEI scores for the actual data set.
Risk attitudes. In column (6) we add a control for risk attitudes by including the average
fraction of points the ￿nancial respondent allocated to the cheaper asset.31 The point estimate
on this measure of risk attitudes indicates that risk tolerance is negatively associated with wealth.
The estimate is economically large; a standard deviation increase in the fraction placed in the
cheaper asset is associated with about 10 percent less household wealth. The estimate is fairly
imprecise, however; we cannot reject a null hypothesis of no relationship (p-value=0.16). As one
might expect given the relatively modest unconditional correlation between the CCEI scores and
risk attitudes (r2 = 0:113), the inclusion of the control for risk attitudes in the experiment leaves
the point estimate of the coe¢ cient on the CCEI virtually una⁄ected. When we omit the control
for risk attitudes, the point estimate of the coe¢ cient on the CCEI is 1.539 (p-value=0.009). The
results are qualitatively similar when, in column (7), we condition on both risk tolerance and the
CCEI scores for the combined data set.
Conscientiousness. In a ￿nal assessment of the relative magnitude of the correlation between the
CCEI and household wealth, we add to the list of controls an in￿ uential measure from psychology,
￿conscientiousness.￿ Conscientiousness is one of the ￿Big Five￿ personality traits, derived from
factor analysis of wide-ranging personality surveys (see, Block, 2010, for a recent description and
assessment of the ￿Big Five￿ ). The CentERpanel survey contains 10 questions related to conscien-
tiousness, each recorded on a scale from 1 to 5. For each respondent, we sum his or her responses
to these 10 questions, and then normalize the scores to generate a measure with sample mean 0
and standard deviation 1.32
In column (8) we repeat the estimation reported in column (7), restricting attention to the
sample of subjects for whom we have valid data on conscientiousness. In column (9) we add the
31To avoid the in￿ uence of extreme outliers, and to place this variable on equal footing, we again omit the top and
bottom half of one percent of the distribution of this risk attitude measure, a total of 10 households (1.8 percent).
The results are qualitatively similar when we include these households.
32The respondents are asked to evaluate the accuracy of 10 statements as descriptions of themselves. The statements
include: ￿I do chores right away,￿ ￿I am accurate in my work,￿ and ￿I am always well prepared,￿ among others.
When the statement indicates a lack of conscientiousness, we re-ordered the responses so that higher scores re￿ ect
greater conscientiousness. No other element of the Big Five is included in the CentERpanel survey.
23measure of conscientiousness to the list of controls. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on conscien-
tiousness is large. A standard deviation increase in conscientiousness is associated with about 10
percent more wealth. (In this sample, a standard deviation increase in the CCEI is associated with
approximately 22 percent more wealth.) The standard error on the conscientiousness coe¢ cient is
relatively large, however, and we cannot reject a null hypothesis of no correlation. Most important,
adding the control for conscientiousness has very little e⁄ect on the coe¢ cient on the CCEI, which
suggests that the conditional correlation between the CCEI and wealth is unlikely to be driven by
an unmeasured correlation between the CCEI and productive personality traits. We emphasize the
term productive to highlight that, among the Big Five factors, conscientiousness appears to be the
best predictor of economic performances (see, Barrick and Mount, 1991).
Finally, the estimates based on the alternative measures of GARP violations of Varian (1990, 1991)
and HM yield qualitatively similar conclusions. In the case of the HM index, the standard errors
are relatively small and the opposite is true of the Varian (1990, 1991) index (see Online Appendix
III).
6.3 Sources of correlation
We ￿nd an economically large and statistically signi￿cant correlation between household wealth
and the ￿nancial respondent￿ s CCEI score in the experiment. We show that this correlation is
robust to the inclusion of controls for current income, education, family structure, risk attitudes in
the experiment, and a widely-used personality test. With these results in mind, we now turn to
investigate further the sources of this correlation. The estimation results are reported in Table 9
below. We again focus on the CCEI, but the estimates based on the alternative measures of GARP
violations of Varian (1990, 1991) and HM yield qualitatively very similar results (see Online Ap-
pendix III). To reduce the importance of extreme outliers, in columns (3)-(10) we drop households
whose fraction of wealth in the relevant category (checking, saving, stocks, housing) is less than
-0.15 or greater than 1.15.
[Table 9 here]
Income. One hypothesis is that the correlation between consistency with utility maximization in
the experiment and wealth derives from a correlation between the CCEI and unobserved (past)
income. Our ￿nding that adding controls has only a modest e⁄ect on the CCEI coe¢ cient casts
some doubt on this concern. We can evaluate it further, however, by exploiting some limited panel
data on household income. The CentERpanel has been operating since 1993. However, income
data for most households who responded to the 2009 survey and completed our experiment do
24not go back nearly that far. To strike a balance between capturing more income information and
maintaining reasonable sample sizes, we go back ￿ve years and use household income information
for every other year.
In column (1) we repeat the estimation reported in column (2) of Table 8, this time restricting
attention to the 377 households (73 percent) for whom we have household income data from 2004
and 2006, as well as from 2008. In this smaller sample, the point estimate on the CCEI remains
economically large and statistically signi￿cant (p-value=0.012). In column (2), we add controls for
the natural log of household income in 2004 and 2006. As a result, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient
on the CCEI declines somewhat (by 0.115). We interpret this ￿nding to indicate that some of
the correlation between wealth and the CCEI may be attributable to a correlation between the
CCEI and unobserved past income. The CentERpanel income data limit our ability to pursue this
hypothesis further; we therefore view it as an important topic for future research with other data.
Portfolio. An alternative set of hypotheses would attribute the correlation between wealth and
the CCEI to di⁄erences in ￿nancial decisions between those with higher and lower CCEI scores.
To evaluate these hypotheses, in columns (3)-(8), we present estimates that relate the CCEI of
the household￿ s ￿nancial respondent to portfolio choices, speci￿cally, whether the household has
a checking account, a savings account, owns stocks, and the fraction of the household￿ s wealth
held in each of these assets. The results provide some evidence that, conditional on household
sociodemographics, education, and current income, households with ￿nancial respondents with
higher CCEI scores put less of their wealth in low-risk and low-return assets such as checking
and savings accounts. The coe¢ cients on the CCEI in columns (4) and (6) are quite modest
in magnitude but statistically signi￿cant at the 10 percent level (p-values of 0.078 and 0.062,
respectively). The results also provide some evidence that individuals with higher CCEI scores are
somewhat more likely to participate in the stock market, though this relationship is not statistically
signi￿cant.
Housing. Finally, the coe¢ cients on the CCEI in columns (9) and (10) show economically sub-
stantial and statistically signi￿cant correlations between the CCEI and decisions regarding home
ownership. Households with ￿nancial respondents with higher CCEI scores are more likely to own
a home and they put a larger fraction of their household￿ s wealth in a home. A standard deviation
increase in the CCEI of the ￿nancial respondent is associated with an increase of 5.2 percentage
points in the probability of owning a home (about 69 percent of households in the sample own a
home). Similarly, a standard deviation increase in the CCEI is associated with an increase of 4.7
percentage points in the fraction of wealth held in housing (the average fraction of wealth held in
housing in the data is approximately 54 percent). The tendency for those with higher CCEI scores
25to own a home and put more of their wealth in housing is especially interesting given the favorable
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in the Netherlands, which indicates both that owning
a home has an important advantage over renting and that, other things equal, wealth placed in
mortgaged housing pays a substantial premium.33 This suggests that owning a home and placing
more wealth in mortgaged housing are often high quality ￿nancial decisions. If so, the positive
correlation between the CCEI and these decisions is what we would expect if the CCEI captured a
general tendency toward higher quality ￿nancial decision-making.
7 Related literature
Our paper relates to several strands of prior research. One strand is the large and rapidly
growing literature that relates measures of cognitive ability and economic literacy to important
economic behaviors in ￿the wild.￿Examples include Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), Fang et al. (2008)
and Banks et al. (2010). Lusardi (2008) and the papers included in the November 2010 issue of
the Economic Journal (Volume 120, Issue 548) o⁄er nice reviews. Like much of that literature, our
paper correlates economic behaviors in ￿the wild￿with performance on an experimental task. But
our approach is distinct in a couple of ways. First, we present subjects with a standard consumer
decision problem: the selection of a bundle of (contingent) commodities from a standard budget
set. Secondly, the decision problems are presented on a user-friendly graphical interface that allows
for the collection of a rich individual-level data set. The large amount of data generated by this
design allows us to apply revealed preference theory to determine whether the observed choices are
consistent with utility maximization. Overall, we view our methods and results as complementing
those based on cognitive functioning, IQ and economic literacy tasks, and anticipate that future
work will investigate the relationship between economic rationality, performance on these other
tasks, and important economic behaviors.
By analyzing the sociodemographic correlates of economic rationality, our paper also contributes
to the emerging literature on the relation of laboratory behaviors to cognitive abilities (see, for ex-
ample, Benjamin et al., 2006, and Dohmen et al., 2010). We di⁄er from these prior studies as
33In the Netherlands, assets held in owner-occupied housing are not subject to the usual presumptive capital income
tax. If they were, the imputed rent would be 4 percent of housing value and that implicit income would be taxed at
30 percent. Instead, imputed rent is presumed to be very low (currently 0.55 percent of housing value), is subject
to the progressive tax on labor income, and that tax is not even due unless the household claims a deduction for
mortgage interest. Nominal mortgage interest is, in turn, fully deductable from taxable income. Thus, for purposes
of federal taxation, housing assets underwritten by a mortgage will typically pay a negative rate of return. In this
way, according to van Ewijk et al. (2007), the Netherlands o⁄ers by far the most favorable tax treatment of owner
occupied housing in Western Europe.
26we use the extent of consistency with utility-maximizing behavior as a single measure for ￿eco-
nomic cognition￿and investigate the correlation between consistency under laboratory conditions
and sociodemographic and economic characteristics. Because the experimental task involves choice
under risk, the paper also relates to the experimental literature that investigates whether the risk
attitudes that arise in the laboratory are connected to attributes that subjects bring to the exper-
iments from outside the lab. von Gaudecker et al. (forthcoming) also conducted risk experiments
with CentERpanel members. Our ￿ndings in this paper are consistent with their conclusion that
￿while many people exhibit consistent choice patterns, some have very high error propensities.￿The
relation of our experimental results to individual characteristics also sheds light on the external
validity of our ￿ndings, which Levitt and List (2007) and Falk and Heckman (2009) point out is a
critical concern for experimental studies.
Finally, related to our revealed-preference tests, but somewhat further a￿eld, our paper also
contributes to the literature that has implemented these tests on aggregate consumption data. Such
real-world data do not, however, provide a particularly rigorous test of consistency because choice
sets are such that budget lines do not cross frequently (see Blundell et al., 2003). Furthermore,
even a high level of consistency in the individual-level decisions does not imply that aggregate data
are consistent. Cox (1987), Sippel (1997), Mattei (2000), Harbaugh et al. (2001), and Andreoni
and Miller (2002), among others, ask whether behavior in the laboratory is consistent with utility
maximization. The Bronars (1987) test has been widely used, so it allows us to relate our results to
this literature. Our study has the highest Bronars power of one (all random subjects had violations).
We note that even random behavior can appear consistent if the sample size is small, as it often is
in experimental studies.
8 Concluding remarks
Some people make better economic decisions than others. But it is usually hard to tell whether
someone has made bad choices; he might have uncommon preferences, or face unobserved con-
straints, or hold (reasonable) beliefs that rationalize his decisions. Standard economic analysis
takes a libertarian approach; in the absence of data that allow us to identify bad decisions, we
assume that all choices are good. The libertarian approach has obvious appeal. We rightly hesitate
to evaluate the quality of decisions when we do not have su¢ cient information to make a de￿nitive
judgement.
This study suggests an alternative path. We o⁄ered a new ￿eld experimental design￿ employing
graphical representations of standard consumer decision problems and using a rich pool of subjects￿
that enables us to collect richer data than has been possible in the past. These data allow us to say
27some choices are better than others, in that some choices are more rational than others. Because
the data are provided by a relatively large and heterogenous sample, we can thoroughly analyze the
correlates of individual levels of rationality and relate rationality in this simple domain to important
economic outcomes like wealth.
The conclusions of our investigation can be summarized under three headings:
￿ Many subjects reveal nearly perfect consistency with utility maximization in the individual-
level decisions. Our non-trivial tests of consistency suggest that nearly half of our subjects
exhibit behavior that appears to be almost optimizing in the sense that their choices come
close to satisfying GARP according to a number of standard measures. At the same time,
there is considerable heterogeneity in the consistency scores across subjects.
￿ Although individual behaviors are heterogeneous, subjects￿consistency scores are correlated
with sociodemographic and economic characteristics. Our study provides, to our knowledge,
the ￿rst experimental evidence on the question ￿who is more rational?￿ The relationships
between sociodemographics and levels of rationality may ultimately prove to be useful for
informing the design of social programs (Manski, 2001) or (libertarian) paternalistic policies
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003).
￿ Di⁄erences in the experimental consistency scores help explain di⁄erential patterns of wealth
across households. The magnitudes are large, implying that a standard deviation increase
in the consistency score is associated with 15-19 percent more wealth. This result is little
changed when we add controls for income, education, family structure, risk tolerance or
measures of personality. This ￿nding is especially notable given the substantial heterogeneity
in our experimental outcomes, and the brief experimental exposure.
The experimental techniques that we have developed provide some promising tools for future
work, and the results suggest a number of potential directions. One direction exploits the fact that
the experimental platform and analytic techniques are applicable to many other types of individual
choice problems. We have already run a pilot experiment to apply these techniques to the domain
of intertemporal choice. A goal of this line of research is to generate analogous individual-level data
with which to evaluate the quality of individual-level decision-making over time.
A principal limitation of our current data set is sample size. While large by experimental
economics standards, the sample is too small for purposes of detailed disaggregation of behavior,
especially with respect to sociodemographic characteristics. Another promising direction is to
conduct an additional set of experiments with more panel members. Of particular interest is the
relationship between consistency of choice and age. By combining experimental and survey data
28on the elderly, we can better understand the reasons why, in previous studies, older people appear
to be leaving ￿money on the table.￿In this new set of experiments, we will collect a much wider
range of individual sociodemographic, cognitive and economic information from the panel members,
focusing especially on health and medical information.
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Female 45.43 37.89 50.00
Age
16-34 18.53 3.16 26.14
Table 1. Sociodemographic information
35-49 26.14 12.11 32.13
50-64 35.62 38.42 27.58
65+ 19.71 46.32 14.15
Education
Low 33.59 42.63 30.99
Medium 29.70 22.63 31.61
High 36.72 34.74 37.40 g 36.7 3. 7 37. 0
Household monthly income
€0-2500    22.42 34.73 21.28
€2500-3499 25.13 26.32 18.90
€3500-4999 28.85 16.32 28.93
€5000+ 23.60 22.63 30.89
Occupation
Paid work 53.13 39.47 62.91 Paid work 53.13 39.47 62.91
House work 11.59 7.89 8.78
Retired 20.90 42.63 13.95
Others 14.38 10.00 14.36
Household composition
Partnered 80.88 67.89 82.64
# of children 0.84 0.32 1.09
# of obs. 1182 190 968 # of obs. 1182 190 968
Participants completed the experiment, dropouts logged in and
quit the experiment, and nonparticipants were recruited for the
experiment but never logged in. The low, medium and high
education levels correspond to primary or pre-vocational
secondary education, pre-university secondary education or senior
vocational training, and vocational college or university education,
respectively. The classification of occupations is based on the
categorization of Statistics Netherlands.
Participants completed the experiment, dropouts logged in and
quit the experiment, and nonparticipants were recruited for the
experiment but never logged in. The low, medium and high
education levels correspond to primary or pre-vocational
secondary education, pre-university secondary education or senior
vocational training, and vocational college or university education,
respectively. The classification of occupations is based on the
categorization of Statistics Netherlands.Mean Std. Dev. 10 25 50 75 90 # of obs.
All 0.881 0.141 0.676 0.808 0.930 0.998 1.000 1182
Fl 0 874 0 147 0 666 0 796 0 928 0 998 1 000 537
Table 2. CCEI scores
Percentiles
Female 0.874 0.147 0.666 0.796 0.928 0.998 1.000 537
Age
16-34 0.920 0.119 0.734 0.881 0.979 1.000 1.000 219
35-49 0.906 0.123 0.708 0.853 0.966 1.000 1.000 309
50-64 0.863 0.142 0.666 0.784 0.901 0.985 1.000 421
65+ 0.843 0.164 0.595 0.770 0.882 0.981 1.000 233 65+ 0.843 0.164 0.595 0.770 0.882 0.981 1.000 233
Education
Low 0.863 0.143 0.665 0.782 0.906 0.987 1.000 397
Medium 0.881 0.140 0.689 0.814 0.926 0.998 1.000 351
High 0.899 0.137 0.686 0.842 0.963 1.000 1.000 430
Household monthly  income
€0-2500    0.856 0.154 0.617 0.769 0.911 0.983 1.000 269
€2500-3499 0.885 0.133 0.705 0.809 0.925 0.999 1.000 302
€3500-4999 0.882 0.141 0.649 0.817 0.932 0.999 1.000 345
€5000+ 0.901 0.131 0.729 0.836 0.968 1.000 1.000 266
Occupation
Paid work 0 896 0 131 0 705 0 833 0 950 1 000 1 000 628 Paid work 0.896 0.131 0.705 0.833 0.950 1.000 1.000 628
House work 0.873 0.151 0.649 0.795 0.937 0.999 1.000 137
Retired 0.839 0.158 0.597 0.767 0.876 0.971 1.000 247
Others 0.891 0.129 0.712 0.809 0.936 0.998 1.000 170
Household composition
Partnered 0.878 0.142 0.673 0.802 0.927 0.998 1.000 956 Partnered 0.878 0.142 0.673 0.802 0.927 0.998 1.000 956
Children 0.899 0.128 0.704 0.835 0.959 1.000 1.000 490
Afriat's (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) is bounded between zero and one. The closer it is to
one, the closer the data are to satisfying GARP; and the difference between the CCEI and one can be
interpreted as an upper bound of the fraction of income that an individual is "wasting" by making
inconsistent choices.∆
Mean Std. Dev. 10 25 50 75 90 Mean
All 0.733 0.229 0.394 0.584 0.775 0.943 0.985 0.148
Fl 0 733 0 224 0 409 0 588 0 767 0 941 0 984 0 141
Table 3. CCEI scores for the combined data set
Percentiles
Female 0.733 0.224 0.409 0.588 0.767 0.941 0.984 0.141
Age
16-34 0.786 0.228 0.442 0.637 0.881 0.976 0.995 0.134
35-49 0.782 0.206 0.481 0.652 0.845 0.962 0.991 0.124
50-64 0.700 0.225 0.371 0.552 0.735 0.898 0.973 0.163
65+ 0.679 0.242 0.334 0.489 0.703 0.902 0.968 0.165 65+ 0.679 0.242 0.334 0.489 0.703 0.902 0.968 0.165
Education
Low 0.699 0.226 0.374 0.535 0.732 0.902 0.967 0.163
Medium 0.733 0.226 0.394 0.595 0.768 0.941 0.986 0.148
High 0.767 0.227 0.428 0.625 0.849 0.968 0.992 0.131
Household monthly  income
€0-2500    0.706 0.218 0.382 0.535 0.737 0.902 0.977 0.150
€2500-3499 0.741 0.220 0.439 0.612 0.768 0.946 0.986 0.143
€3500-4999 0.730 0.236 0.388 0.556 0.782 0.950 0.984 0.151
€5000+ 0.755 0.238 0.383 0.627 0.841 0.952 0.992 0.146
Occupation
Paid work 0 758 0 222 0 428 0 615 0 817 0 955 0 991 0 139 Paid work 0.758 0.222 0.428 0.615 0.817 0.955 0.991 0.139
House work 0.719 0.233 0.380 0.548 0.765 0.928 0.986 0.154
Retired 0.675 0.231 0.334 0.502 0.698 0.872 0.964 0.164
Others 0.738 0.231 0.406 0.599 0.793 0.951 0.983 0.153
Household composition
Partnered 0.729 0.229 0.389 0.583 0.771 0.938 0.984 0.149 Partnered 0.729 0.229 0.389 0.583 0.771 0.938 0.984 0.149
Children 0.760 0.216 0.443 0.614 0.815 0.952 0.987 0.139
The combined data set is the actual data from the experiment and the mirror-image data. By definition, the
CCEI score for the combined data set consisting of 50 observations can be no bigger than the CCEI score


























































      .068 .058
# of obs. 1182 1182
# of children
Partnered
Dependent variables: (1) CCEI; (2) CCEI for the combined data set. Omitted
2 R
Dependent variables: (1) CCEI; (2) CCEI for the combined data set. Omitted
categories: male, age under 35, low education (primary or pre-vocational
secondary education), household gross monthly income under €2500, retired,
and not having a partner. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
2 ROutcome Selection Outcome Selection
.888*** .544* .891*** -2.077***
(.022) (.311) (.023) (.209)




() () () ()
-.024*** .084 -.024*** -.031
(.009) (.103) (.009) (.068)
Age
-.016 -.556** -.016 -.133
(.011) (.230) (.011) (.102)
-.051*** -1.024*** -.052*** -.393***




-.050** -1.556*** -.051** -.824***
(.021) (.263) (.020) (.154)
Education
.009 .191 .009 -.036
(.011) (.122) (.011) (.081)
.026** .168 .026** .006






.025** .303** .025** .281***
(.012) (.125) (.012) (.094)
.019 .426*** .019 .186**
(.013) (.141) (.014) (.094)
.033** .064 .033** .080






.028 -.202 .029 -.040
(.018) (.172) (.018) (.131)
.046** .108 .046** .083
(.020) (.200) (.020) (.148)
.037** .081 .037* .110






-.026** .262** -.027** .123
(.011) (.119) (.011) (.092)
.001 .145** .001 .031















1372 2340Outcome Selection Outcome Selection
.759*** .545*  .757*** -2.067***





() () () ()
-.013 .084 -.011  -.032
(.015) (.104) (.015) (.068)
Age
-.001 -.554** -.009 -.135
(.022) (.223) (.020) (.101)
-.062** -1.023***  -.079***  -.397***




-.049 -1.557*** -.078** -.822***
(.042) (.258) (.032) (.154)
Education
.016 .191 .021 -.036
(.018) (.120) (.017) (.081)
.054*** .169 .059*** .007






.017 .304** .022 .276***
(.021) (.127) ( .019) (.093)
-.006 .428*** .003 .174*
(.022) (.138) (.020) (.094)
.015 .065 .018 .075






.034 -.203 .031 -.035
(.027) (.173) (.026) (.131)
.036 .109 .038 .075
(.030) (.205) (.030) (.148)
.032 .081 .034 .110






-.032 .261** -.026 .126
(.020) (.115) (.018) (.091)
-.000 .145** .002 .028













Dependent variables: (1) and (2) CCEI; (3) and (4) CCEI for the combined data set.
Omitted categories: male, age under 35, low education (primary or pre-vocational
secondary education), household gross monthly income under €2500, retired, and not
having a partner. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, and 1
t ii f i ll ti l
Dependent variables: (1) and (2) CCEI; (3) and (4) CCEI for the combined data set.
Omitted categories: male, age under 35, low education (primary or pre-vocational
secondary education), household gross monthly income under €2500, retired, and not
having a partner. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, and 1















Household wealth 154,280 158,540 4,260
(10,223) (9,888) (14,222)
346 347
Log household wealth 11.08 11.23 0.16
(0 11) (0 10) (0 15)
Age-adjusted CCEI
# of obs.
Table 6. Household wealth






















Table 7. Wealth components
(average 2008-2009 in 2008 Euros by age-adjusted CCEI)
(0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
312 310
Checking accounts 2,787 2,458 -329
(370) (204) (423)
346 347
Savings accounts 20,572 22,931 2,359
(1,591) (2,271) (2,774)
346 347
Stocks 9,151 12,376 3,226
(1,569) (2,488) (2,943)
346 347
House value 180,528 186,539 6,011
(9,430) (8,545) (12,724)
346 347
Debts 3,650 4,260 611
(710) (712) (1,006)
346 347























The age-adjusted CCEI is the residual from a regression of CCEI on a constant, age,
age² and age³. Standard errors in parentheses. The last row in each category reports the
number of observations.(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.170** 1.425** 99933.2* 1.490***





-0.275* -0.228 -28223.9* -0.258
(0.154) (0.164) (15906.3) (0.162)
0.004 -0.286 -33974.7 -0.277
(0.205) (0.316) (27100.3) (0.318)
0.002 0.006 726.5 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (471.1) (0.005)
0.000 0.000 -4.3 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (2.7) (0.000)
0.623*** 0.682*** 48106.5*** 0.683***
(0.173) (0.183) (16995.7) (0.184)
0.125 0.103 14472.9* 0.106







Table 8. The relationship between households' net worth and CCEI scores
CCEI
CCEI  (combined dataset)
Risk tolerance

















0.229 5.932 335793.4 5.451
(3.554) (5.862) (5.0E+05) (6.110)
0.217 0.179 0.191 0.170







2 R(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.348* 1.545*** 1.563** 1.781** 1.728**
(0.714) (0.591) (0.735) (0.746) (0.750)
0.078 -0.018 -0.091 -0.038
(0.381) (0.373) (0.381) (0.384)
-1.166 -1.165 -1.361 -1.366
(0.828) (0.829) (0.838) (0.840)
0.103
(0.072)
0.602*** 0.595*** 0.595*** 0.520*** 0.514***
(0.127) (0.128) (0.129) (0.121) (0.121)
-0.229 -0.232 -0.232 -0.299 -0.321
(0.164) (0.166) (0.166) (0.168) (0.169)
-0.284 -0.307 -0.308 -0.310 -0.282
(0.316) (0.313) (0.315) (0.319) (0.316)
0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.682*** 0.726*** 0.725*** 0.733*** 0.714***
(0.183) (0.187) (0.188) (0.191) (0.191)
0.103 0.092 0.092 0.095 0.090













CCEI  (combined dataset)
Risk tolerance
Female
Log 2008 household income
2008 household income
Education
0.264 0.331 0.331 0.312 0.351
(0.461) (0.483) (0.484) (0.481) (0.481)
0.596 0.676 0.677 0.675 0.717
(0.486) (0.498) (0.498) (0.499) (0.496)
0.403 0.480 0.481 0.464 0.501
(0.469) (0.493) (0.494) (0.490) (0.490)
0.443 0.549 0.550 0.568 0.598
(0.452) (0.475) (0.480) (0.476) (0.475)
0.672 0.745 0.746 0.774 0.806
(0.474) (0.498) (0.502) (0.501) (0.499)
5.888 6.938 6.947 7.797 7.371
(5.879) (5.786) (5.812) (5.880) (5.841)
0.178 0.186 0.184 0.180 0.182







Dependent variable: The natural log of household wealth, except in (3) where the dependent
variable is the level of household wealth. Sample includes households with financial respondent
age 16 and older in (1) and households with financial respondent age 35 and older in (2)-(9).
Otherwise, samples vary according to availability of data on regressand and regressors. The
CCEI scores for the combined dataset is computed after combining the actual data from the
experiment and the mirror-image data. Risk tolerance measured by the average fraction of tokens
allocated to the cheaper asset. The groupings of different levels of education are based on the
categorization of Statistics Netherlands. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
2 R(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Have Fraction in Have Fraction in
checking checking saving saving
1.907** 1.792** 0.029 -0.100* -0.052 -0.179*
(0.751) (0.705) (0.032) (0.057) (0.051) (0.096)
Log household income
0.686*** 0.250 0.001 -0.030** 0.004 -0.062***





-0.144 -0.037 0.007 0.019 0.008 0.017
(0.188) (0.184) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029)
-0.315 -0.241 -0.005 0.029 -0.007 0.001
(0.318) (0.319) (0.010) (0.044) (0.042) (0.061)
0.007 0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.790*** 0.740*** -0.005 -0.033 0.016 -0.058*
(0.222) (0.222) (0.004) (0.021) (0.022) (0.033)
0.111 0.123 0.000 -0.004 -0.025* -0.043***
(0.107) (0.101) (0.001) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
Education













0.622 0.658 -0.007 0.002 0.036 0.003
(0.613) (0.626) (0.007) (0.063) (0.068) (0.085)
0.883 0.889 -0.017 -0.021 -0.004 -0.073
(0.626) (0.641) (0.018) (0.063) (0.075) (0.087)
0.899 0.956 0.005 0.000 0.043 -0.046
(0.616) (0.632) (0.004) (0.063) (0.069) (0.086)
1.011* 0.954 0.002 -0.005 0.014 -0.037
(0.601) (0.617) (0.002) (0.062) (0.069) (0.083)
1.182* 1.027 0.003 0.011 0.019 -0.076
(0.610) (0.625) (0.003) (0.064) (0.071) (0.086)
4.282 -0.415 1.036*** 0.045 1.117 1.420
(5.947) (6.032) (0.183) (0.750) (0.779) (1.197)
0.236 0.269 0.024 0.051 0.020 0.104







2 R(7) (8) (9) (10)
Have Fraction in Have Fraction in
stocks stocks a house house
0.160 -0.003 0.371** 0.336***
(0.160) (0.050) (0.150) (0.129)
Log household income
0.154*** 0.011 0.138*** 0.098***
(0.032) (0.010) (0.027) (0.023)
-0.005 0.005 -0.021 -0.039
(0.046) (0.012) (0.044) (0.039)
0.089 0.011 -0.001 -0.030
(0.088) (0.021) (0.081) (0.065)
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.003 -0.008 0.211*** 0.136***
(0.049) (0.014) (0.051) (0.044)
0.003 0.000 0.051** 0.069***















-0.074 -0.042 0.030 0.067
(0.128) (0.049) (0.123) (0.109)
0.036 -0.011 0.090 0.071
(0.138) (0.052) (0.129) (0.114)
-0.050 -0.029 0.064 0.064
(0.131) (0.048) (0.124) (0.111)
0.024 -0.023 0.078 0.044
(0.128) (0.049) (0.122) (0.108)
0.194 0.011 0.089 0.051
(0.136) (0.051) (0.127) (0.113)
-3.326** -0.287 -1.508 -0.777
(1.678) (0.388) (1.592) (1.289)
0.106 0.029 0.174 0.146







To reduce the importance of extreme outliers, in columns (3)-(10) we drop
households whose fraction of wealth in the relevant category (checking, saving,
stocks, housing) is less than -0.15 or greater than 1.15. The groupings of
different levels of education are based on the categorization of Statistics
Netherlands. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, and 1


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Age Education Monthly income (€) Occupation
Household
composition